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Abstract

life systems remains infeasible. The growth of software size and complexity seems to exceed advances
in veri cation technology. Second, veri cation results apply not to system implementations, but to
formal speci cations of these systems. Construction
of such speci cations is usually a manual and errorprone process. Separate methods are needed, then,
to verify compliance of the system implementation
to its formal speci cation. Testing, on the other
hand, allows one to validate the system implementation directly. However, testing results lack the
rigor of formal analysis and usually do not provide
guarantees of absence of errors in the implementation.
Consequently, whichever analysis approach has
been taken to validate a real-time system, there exists a possibility of incorrect behavior during the
execution of the system. Run-time monitoring and
checking strives to address this problem.
Computer systems are often monitored for performance evaluation and enhancement [10], debugging and testing [14], and to control or check of system correctness [18]. Recently, the problem of designing monitors to check for the correctness of system implementation has received increased attention from the research community [3, 15, 16, 13, 17].
Such monitors can be used to detect violations of
timing [13] or logical [3] properties of a program,
constraints on language constructs [15], and so on.
In this paper, we describe a framework of monitoring and checking a running system with the aim
of ensuring that it is running correctly with respect
to a formal requirements speci cation. The use
of formal methods is the salient aspect of our approach. We concentrate on the following two issues:
(1) how to map high-level abstract events that are
used in requirement speci cation to low-level activities of a running system, and (2) how to instrument
the code to extract and detect necessary low-level

We describe the Monitoring and Checking (MaC)
framework which provides assurance on the correctness of an execution of a real-time system at runtime. Monitoring is performed based on a formal
speci cation of system requirements. MaC bridges
the gap between formal speci cation, which analyzes
designs rather than implementations, and testing,
which validates implementations but lacks formality. An important aspect of the framework is a
clear separation between implementation-dependent
description of monitored objects and high-level requirements speci cation. Another salient feature is
automatic instrumentation of executable code.
The paper presents an overview of the framework,
languages to express monitoring scripts and requirements, and a prototype implementation of MaC targeted at systems implemented in Java.

1 Introduction
Real-time systems often arise in the area of embedded and safety-critical applications. Dependability of such systems is the utmost concern to their
developers. Much research in the past two decades
concentrated on methods for analysis and validation
of real-time systems. Important results have been
achieved, in particular, in the area of formal veri cation [4]. Formal methods of system analysis allow
developers to specify their systems using mathematical formalisms and prove properties of these speci cations. These formal proofs increase con dence
in correctness of the system's behavior.
Still, complete formal veri cation has not yet become a prevalent method of analysis. The reasons
for this are twofold. First, full veri cation of real1

activities. We assume that both requirement speci cations and the system implementation are available to us.
The major phases of the framework are as follows: (1) system requirements are formalized; at
the same time, a monitoring script is constructed,
which is used to instrument the code and establish a
mapping from low-level information into high-level
events; (2) at run-time, events generated by the
instrumented system are monitored for compliance
with the requirements speci cation. The run-time
monitoring and checking (MaC) architecture consists of three components: lter, event recognizer,
and run-time checker. The lter extracts low-level
information (such as values of program variables
and time when variables change their values) from
the instrumented code. The lter sends this information to the event recognizer, which converts
it into high-level events and conditions and passes
them to the run-time checker.
Each event delivered to the checker has a timestamp, which re ects the actual time of the occurrence of the event. This enables us to monitor realtime properties of the system. Timestamps are assigned to events by the event recognizer based on
the clock readings provided by the lter. The runtime checker checks the correctness of the system
execution thus far according to a requirements speci cation of the system, based on the information it
receives from the event recognizer, and on the past
history. The checker can combine monitoring of behavioral correctness of the system control ow with
program checking [2] for numerical computations.
This integrated approach is a unique feature of the
proposed framework.
The current prototype implementation of the
MaC architecture, monitors systems written in
Java. Instrumentation is performed automatically,
directly in JAVA bytecode. A language called
MEDL, based on a linear temporal logic, is used to
describe the formal requirements. Other formal languages can be readily used to specify requirements.

consider only input/output behavior of the system.
In our opinion, instrumentation of key points in
the system allows us to detect violations faster and
more reliably, without sacri cing too much performance. The test automation approach of [14] is also
targeted towards monitoring of black-box systems
without resorting to instrumentation. Additionally,
we aim at using the MaC framework beyond testing,
during real system executions. Sankar and Mandel have developed a methodology to continuously
monitor an executing Ada program for speci cation
consistency [15]. The user manually annotates an
Ada program with constructs from ANNA, a formal speci cation language. Mok and Liu [13] proposed an approach for monitoring the violation of
timing constraints written in the speci cation language based on Real-time Logic as early as possible with low-overhead. The framework proposed
in this paper does not limit itself to any particular kind of monitored properties. In [10], an elaborate language for speci cation of monitored events
based on relational algebra is proposed. Instrumentation of high-level source code is provided automatically. Collected data are stored in a database.
Since the instrumentation code performs database
queries, instrumentation can signi cantly alter the
performance of a program.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents an overview of the framework. Section 3
informally presents the language for monitoring
scripts and requirements speci cations. Section 4
describes a prototype implementation of the MaC
framework. More complete and formal treatment of
MaC is given in [9].

2 Overview of the MaC Framework
The MaC framework aims at run-time assurance
monitoring of real-time systems. The structure of
the framework is shown in Figure 1. The framework
includes two main phases: (1) before the system is
run, its implementation and requirement speci cation are used to generate run-time monitoring components; (2) during system execution, information
about the running system is collected and matched
against the requirements.
A major task during the rst phase (indicated
by clear boxes in Figure 1) is to provide a mapping between high-level events used in the requirement speci cation, and low-level state information
extracted during execution. They are related explicitly by means of a monitoring script. The

Related work. The \behavioral abstraction" ap-

proach to monitoring was pioneered by Bates and
Wileden [1]. Although their approach lacked formal
foundation, it provided an impetus for future developments. Several other approaches pursue goals
that are similar to ours. The work of [5] addresses
monitoring of a distributed bus-based system, based
on a Petri Net speci cation. Since only the bus
activity is monitored, there is no need for instrumentation of the system. The authors of [16] also
2
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Figure 1. Overview of the MaC framework

Filter. A lter is a set of program fragments
that are inserted into the implementation to instrument the system. The essential functionality of a lter is to keep track of changes to monitored objects
and send pertinent state information to the event
recognizer. Instrumentation is performed statically
directly on the executable code (bytecode, in the
case of Java). Instrumentation is automatic, which
is made possible by the low-level description in the
monitoring script.
Event recognizer. The event recognizer is the
part of the monitor that detects an event from values of monitored variables received from the lter according to the monitoring script. Recognized
events are delivered to the run-time checker. Each
event is supplied with a timestamp that can be used
in checking real-time properties. Events may additionally have associated numerical values to facilitate program checking by the monitor.
While it is conceivable to merge the event recognizer with the lter, we chose to separate the two
modules. The separation allows us to remove the
overhead of abstracting out events from the lowlevel information. This reduces interference of the
monitor with the monitored system's execution. On
the other hand, communication overhead incurred
by sending changes in the monitored data from the
lter to the event recognizer increases, but it applies
only to the o -line processing of the monitored information and is therefore more acceptable. An additional advantage of the chosen design is a clear
separation of monitoring activity from the system

monitoring script describes how events at the requirements level are de ned in terms of monitored
states of an implementation. For example, in a
gate controller of a railroad crossing system, the requirements may be expressed in terms of the event
train in crossing. The implementation, on the
other hand, stores the train's position with respect
to the crossing in a variable train position. The
monitoring script in this case can de ne the event
as condition train position < 800. The language
of monitoring scripts event recognizer (described in
Section 3) has limited expressive power in order to
ensure fast recognition of events.
The monitoring script is used to generate a lter and an event recognizer automatically. The lter instruments the implementation to extract the
necessary state information at run-time. The event
recognizer receives state information from the lter
and determines the occurrences of events according
to their de nition in the script. Also during the
rst phase, the system requirements are formalized,
and a run-time checker is produced from the formal
requirements. The requirement speci cation uses
events de ned in the monitoring script.
During the run-time phase (shaded boxes in Figure 1), the instrumented implementation is executed
while being monitored and checked against the requirements speci cation. The lter sends relevant
state information to the event recognizer, which determines the occurrence of events. These events are
then relayed to the run-time checker to check adherence to the requirements.
3

activity.

3.1 Events and Conditions

Run-time checker. The run-time checker
checks that the current execution satis es the given
requirements, based on the information provided by
the event recognizer. The checker can handle behavioral as well as numerical requirements. The
latter are analyzed using the technique of program
checking. The prototype implementation does not
have provisions for program checking yet. The current implementation uses language MEDL (see Section 3.4) to express requirements.
It may seem that a violation of a requirement
at run time is a catastrophic event, and that it is
too late to recover from it. This, however, is not
necessarily true. A monitored property may represent a potentially dangerous condition that need
to draw the attention of a human operator, which
is the function that the run-time checker provides.
We illustrate this concept with an example in Section 3.5.

As described in Section 2, whenever an \interesting" state change occurs in the running system, the
lter sends a noti cation to the monitor. Based on
the updates from the lter, the monitor matches the
trace of the current execution against the requirements. In order to do this, we distinguish between
two kinds of state information underlying the notications.
Events occur instantaneously during the system
execution. For example, an event denoting return
from method RaiseGate occurs at the instant the
control returns from the method. We can conclude
that this event does not occur at any moment except when the monitor receives an update from the
lter. By contrast, conditions may hold between
updates. Consider monitoring condition (position
== 2). Once the monitor receives a message from
the lter that variable position has been assigned
the value 2, we can conclude that it keeps this value
until the next update comes.
Since events occur instantaneously, we can assign
to each event the time of its occurrence. Timestamps of events allow us to reason about timing
properties of monitored systems. Conditions, on the
other hand, have durations, intervals of time when
the condition is satis ed. There is a close connection between events and conditions: the start and
end of a condition's interval are events, and the interval between any two events can be treated as a
condition. This relationship is made precise below.
This distinction between events and conditions
is formalized in a simple two-sorted logic that denes various operations on events and conditions.
PEDL and MEDL are subsets of this logic with
added means of de nition of primitive events and
conditions.

3 The MaC Language
In this section, we give a brief overview of the
languages used to describe what to observe in the
program and the requirements the program must
satisfy. The scripts written in these languages are
then used to automatically generate the event recognizer and the run-time checker, respectively.
The language for monitoring scripts is called
PEDL (Primitive Event De nition Language, Section 3.3). PEDL scripts are used to de ne what
information is sent from the lter to the event
recognizer, and how they are transformed into
requirements-level events by the event recognizer.
Requirement speci cations are written in MEDL
(Meta Event De nition Language, Section 3.4).
The primary reason for having two separate languages in the monitoring framework is to separate
implementation-speci c details of monitoring from
requirements speci cation. This separation ensures
that the framework is scalable to di erent implementation languages and speci cation formalisms,
while providing a clean interface to the designer of
monitors. For example, if we wish to retarget our
system from programs written in Java to C++, then
all we would need to modify is the syntax of PEDL,
leaving MEDL unchanged.
Objects described in both PEDL and MEDL
scripts are events and conditions. Before we present
the two languages, we illustrate the distinction between events and conditions.

3.2 A Logic for Events & Conditions

Syntax. We assume a countable set

C =
For example, in
the monitoring script language PEDL, these primitive conditions will be Java boolean expressions
built from the values of the monitored variables. In
the requirements description language MEDL these
will be conditions that were recognized by the event
recognizer and sent to the checker.
We also assume a countable set E = f 1 2 g
of primitive events. When an event occurs, it can
have an attribute value, which is an element of a
fc1 ; c2 ; : : :g of primitive conditions.

e ;e ;:::
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The formal semantics for this logic is given in [9].
Notice that some natural equivalences hold in
this logic. For example, for any condition , 
[
( ) ( )). This allows one to identify conditions with pairs of events, and is the reason why the
languages in the MaC framework, are called \event
de nition languages". Also, for conditions 1 and
when 1 when 2  when ( 1
2 , and event ,
&& 2 ).

set De . For example, startM (RaiseGate) is a
primitive event in the monitoring script language,
which occurs at the start of method RaiseGate and
whose attribute value is the tuple of values of all
the parameters with which this method is called.
The primitive events in the requirements description
language will be those that are reported by the event
recognizer.
The logic has two sorts: conditions and events.
The syntax of conditions (C) and events (E) is as
follows:
h i ::= j [ h i , h i ) j ! h i j h i && h i j
i

C

c

E

E

C

C

c

c

c

3.3 Primitive
(PEDL)

C

hE i ::= e j start( hC i ) j end( hC i ) j hE i && hE i
j hE i jj hE i j hE i when hC i

to those for linear temporal logic, in that they are
a sequence of worlds. The worlds correspond to instants in time at which we have information about
the truth values of primitive conditions and events.
Each world is, therefore, labeled by the time instant
it corresponds to and the set of primitive conditions
and events that are true at that instant. Intuitively,
these worlds correspond to the times when the lter (or event recognizer) sends updates, and so these
models are a discrete abstraction of the execution
of the running system.
The intuition in describing the semantics of
events and conditions based on such models, is that
conditions retain their truth values in the duration
between two worlds, while events are present only at
the instants corresponding to certain worlds. The
labels on the worlds give the truth values of primitive conditions and events. The semantics for negation (! ), conjunction ( 1 && 2), disjunction ( 1 jj 2 )
and implication ( 1 ) 2 ) of conditions is de ned
naturally; so ! is true when is false, 1 && 2 is
true only when both 1 and 2 are true, 1 jj 2 is
true when either 1 or 2 is true, and 1 ) 2 is
true if 2 is true whenever 1 is true. Conjunction
( 1 && 2) and disjunction ( 1 jj 2 ) on events is dened similarly. Now, since conditions are true from
some time until just before the instant when they
become false, two events can naturally be associated
with a condition, namely the instant when the condition becomes true (start( )) and the instant when
the condition becomes false (end( )). Any pair of
events de ne an interval of time, and forms a condition [ 1 2 ) that is true from event 1 until 2 .
Finally, the event when is true if occurs and
condition is true at that time instant.
c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

e

e

e

c

c

e ;e

e

e

c

c

c

e

c

Event

Definition

Language

>

c

c

e

c

e

PEDL is the language for writing monitoring
scripts. Design of PEDL is based on the following two principles. First, we encapsulate all
implementation-speci c details of the monitoring
process in PEDL scripts. Second, we want the process of event recognition to be as simple as possible.
Therefore, we limit the constructs of PEDL to allow
one to reason only about the current state in the execution trace. The name of the language re ect the
fact that the main purpose of PEDL scripts is to dene primitive events of requirement speci cations.
Monitored entities. PEDL scripts can refer to
any object of the target system. This means that
declarations of monitored entities are by necessity
speci c to the implementation language of the system. In the current prototype, values of elds of an
object, as well as of local variables of a method, and
method calls can be monitored. Examples of monitored entities' declarations are given in Section 4.
De ning conditions. Primitive conditions
in PEDL, are constructed from boolean-valued
expressions over the monitored variables. An
example of such condition is Cond TooFast =
Train.calculatePosition().trainSpeed
100.
In addition to these, we have primitive condition
InM(f). This condition is true as long as the
execution is currently within method f. Complex
conditions are built from primitive conditions using
boolean connectives.
De ning events. The primitive events in
PEDL correspond to updates of monitored variables
and calls and returns of monitored methods. Each
event has an associated timestamp and may have a
tuple of values.
The event update(x) is triggered when variable
is assigned a value. The value associated with this
event is the new value of x. Events StartM(f) and
EndM(f) are triggered when control enters method
f (resp., returns from f. The value associated with

Semantics. The models for this logic are similar

c

e

c

hC i jj hC i j hC i ) hC i

c

c

start c ; end c

x

e

e

c
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(RaisingGate)) records the time of occurrence of
event RaisingGate in the auxiliary variable t. Expression e1 -> count e1 := count e1 + 1 counts
occurrences of event e1. A special auxiliary variable currentTime can be used to refer to the cur-

is a tuple containing the values of all arguments. The value of an event EndM is a tuple that
has the return value of the method, along with the
values of all the formal parameters at the time control returns from the method. Besides these three,
we have one other primitive event which is IoM(f).
This is also triggered when control returns from a
method f, but has as its value a tuple that contains the return value of the method, and the values
of the arguments at the time of method invocation.
This event allows one to look at the input-output
behavior of a method, and is needed if one wants to
program check some numerical computation. Notice
that event IoM(f) is the only event to violate our
second design principle, namely that the operation
of the event recognizer is to be based only on the
current state.
All the operations on events de ned in the logic
can be used to construct more complex events from
these primitive events. In PEDL, we also have two
attributes time and value, de ned for events. As
mentioned in section 3.2, events have associated
with them attribute values, and the time of their
occurrence, and these can be accessed using the attributes time and value. time(e) gives the time
of the last occurrence of event e, while value(e)
gives the value associated with e, provided e occurs. time(e) refers to the time on the clock of
the monitored system (which may be di erent from
the clock of the monitor) when this event occurs.
If the monitored system has several clocks, we assume, for this paper, that the clocks are perfectly
synchronized.
StartM

rent time of the system. Precisely, it is set to be the
timestamp of the last message received from the lter.
De ning events and conditions. The primitive events and conditions in MEDL are those that
are de ned in PEDL. Besides these, primitive conditions can also be de ned by boolean expressions
using the auxiliary variables. More complex events
and conditions are then built up using the various
connectives described in section 3.2. These events
and conditions are then used to de ne the safety
properties and alarms.
Safety Properties and Alarms. The correctness of the system is described in terms safety
properties and alarms. Safety properties are conditions that must always be true during the execution. Alarms, on the other hand, are events that
must never be raised. Note that all safety properties [12] can be described in this way. Also observe
that alarms and safety properties are complementary ways of expressing the same thing. The reason
we have both of them is because some properties
are easier to think of in terms of conditions, while
others are easier to think of in terms of alarms.

3.5 Example

We illustrate the use of PEDL and MEDL using
a simple but representative example. The example
is inspired by the railroad crossing problem, which
is routinely used as an illustration of real-time formalisms [7]. The system is composed of a gate that
can open and close, taking some time to do it, trains
that pass through the crossing, and a controller that
is responsible for closing the gate when a train approaches the crossing and opening it after it passes.
The common speci cation approach is to assume
an upper bound on the time necessary for the gate
to open or close. In reality, however, mechanical
malfunctions may result in unexpectedly slow operation of the gate. A timely detection of such a
violation lets the train engineer stop the train before it reaches the crossing. In this example, we
monitor the controller of the gate, using the requirement that the gate is down within 30 seconds after
signal CloseGate is sent, unless signal OpenGate is
sent before the time elapses. Precisely, we check
that if there is a signal CloseGate, not followed by

3.4 Meta Event Definition Language (MEDL)

The safety requirements that need to be monitored are written in a language called MEDL. Like
PEDL, MEDL is also based on the logic for events
and conditions, described in section 3.2. Primitive
events and conditions in MEDL scripts are imported
from PEDL monitoring scripts; hence the language
has the adjective \meta".
Auxiliary variables. The logic described is section 3.2 has a limited expressive power. For example, one cannot count the number of occurrences
of an event, or talk about the th occurrence of an
event. For this purpose, MEDL allows the user to
de ne auxiliary variables, whose values may then
be used to de ne events and conditions. Auxiliary variables must be of one of the basic types in
Java. Updates of auxiliary variables are triggered by
events. For example, RaisingGate -> t := time
i

6

class GateController {
public static final int GATE_UP
= 0;
public static final int GATE_DOWN = 1;
public static final int IN_TRANSIT = 2;
int gatePosition;
public void open() { ... }
public void close() { ... }
...
};

import event OpenGate, CloseGate;
import condition Gate_Down;
AuxVarDecl:
float lastClose;
float currentTime;
SafePropDef:
Cond GateClosing =
[ CloseGate when !Gate_Down,
OpenGate || start(Gate_Down)
) => lastClose + 30 > currentTime;
AuxVarDefL
CloseGate -> lastClose := time(CloseGate);

Figure 2. Implementation of the gate controller

4 The Current MaC Prototype System

either signal OpenGate or completion of gate closing, is present in the execution trace, then the time
elapsed since that signal is less than 30.
Figure 2 shows a fragment of the gate controller
implemented as a Java class. The state of the
gate is represented as variable gatePosition, which
can assume constant values GATE UP, GATE DOWN,
or IN TRANSIT. The controller controls the gate by
means of methods open() and close(). For simplicity, we assume that there is only one instance of
class GateController in the system.
We need to observe calls to methods open() and
close(), and the state of the gate. The following
PEDL script introduces high-level events OpenGate,
CloseGate and Gate Down.

This section introduces a prototype implementation of the MAC framework. The prototype closely
follows the general architecture (see Figure 1 in Section 2). We discuss implementation aspects of the
lter, the event recognizer and the run-time checker.
4.1 Filter and Code Instrumentation

Java bytecode has been selected as the basis for
instrumentation for the following reasons: (1) a
class le, the unit of Java bytecode, contains rich
symbolic information about the system [11] that
can be used for automatic instrumentation; (2) Java
bytecode is strongly typed and excludes pointer
arithmetic; (3) growing popularity of Java, combined with platform independence of Java bytecode
will make the framework widely applicable. In addition, there are many high languages like Ada and
Lisp which compile its source code into Java bytecode [19].
Several aspects of the presented framework
present implementation challenges. We now brie y
outline these challenges and describe the limitations
of the prototype.
Naming of monitored objects. In order
to specify monitored entities unambiguously, we
use hierarchical names constructed from identi ers
used in the source code. The following meaning is
ascribed to a name x.y: (1) if x is a class name, y
is a eld or a method of the class. If y is not static,
it will apply to every instance of x; (2) if x is a
variable of type T, y is a eld or a method of class
T; (3) if x is a method of class T, y is a local variable
of x. Unless y is of a primitive (non-reference) Java
type, the name can be extended further according
to the same rules. Examples of declarations include
RRC.train x,
Train.position().trainSpeed,

export event OpenGate, CloseGate;
export condition Gate_Down;
Monitored Entities:
void GateController.open();
void GateController.close();
int GateController.gatePosition;
CondDef:
Cond Gate_Down = (GateController.gatePosition
== GateController.GATE_DOWN);
EventDef:
Event OpenGate =
StartM(GateController.open());
Event CloseGate =
StartM(GateController.close());

The correctness requirement for the gate is given
in the MEDL script below. The time of the last occurrence of event CloseGate is recorded by the auxiliary variable lastClose. The requirement uses the
events and conditions imported from the monitoring
script and states that if there was a CloseGate event
at the time when the gate was not down, which was
not followed by either event OpenGate or condition
Gate Down becoming true, then the time allotted for
gate closing has not elapsed yet.
7

dated values, together with a timestamp and identi cation of the thread that occasioned the update,
whenever it detects an updating of a monitored entity. To minimize the overhead to the system, sending values to event recognizer through the network
is performed by a separate thread.

and Gate.gateDown(). The rst of these declarations denotes eld train x of class RRC, the second
identi es local variable trainSpeed of method
position in class Train. The last one identi es a
method in class Gate.
Detection of object updates. We need to
guarantee that all updates to a monitored object
are reported. Two problems need to be addressed:
aliasing, where an object can be monitored through
several references, and reference changing, where a
reference is modi ed to refer to an object that was
not intended to be monitored.
In general, we do not know statically which references refer to the object of interest. We have,
therefore, to check accesses through all reference
variables of the same type. The user has the option
to enable this feature explicitly. However, most of
the monitored objects in the examples that we have
considered are always accessed through the same
reference. Therefore, we chose to disable the feature by default.
A lter consists of a set of code fragments inserted into class les of the target system and Java
class, which provides for storing update information
and communication between lter and event recognizer. The following kinds of program entities can
be instrumented:
1) Execution points. The current prototype detects when the execution point reaches a method invocation, return from the method, start and end of
program and exception of method. Invocation and
return from the method can be detected by inserting the instrumentation before the rst instruction
and after the last instruction of the code for the
method. Exceptions are monitored by instrumenting the exception table of the method.
2) Local and eld variables. Every local variable is always accessed through an index xed in a
bytecode instruction. There are only two kinds of
instructions that may modify a local variable. Instrumentation is inserted immediately following the
update. Similarly, there is only one instruction that
accesses a eld variable in an object, and the access
is through a xed parameter in the bytecode.
The lter is generated by lter generator which
is written in Java using JTrek library [6] for inserting bytecode fragments into the program. The
lter generator gets a program which is to be instrumented and a list of monitored variables and
monitored methods as input. It generates the instrumented program as output by inserting codes at
proper places of the program. The lter sends up-

4.2 Event recognizer

The event recognizer translates low-level state
changes communicated by the lter, into high-level
events and conditions. The event recognizer maintains a table that stores the current value for each
monitored variable. Each message from the lter
causes this table to be updated.
Whenever an update from the lter arrives,
the event recognizer re-evaluates the truth of all
events and conditions. Conditions de ned in terms
boolean expressions over the monitored variables
can be directly evaluated from the table of current
values of all monitored variables. However, in order
to identify events start(c) and end(c), it must
not only know the current truth value of condition
c, but also its truth value at the time of the previous update. The same is true for the event end(c).
Hence the checker also keeps track of the values of all
the conditions at the time of the previous update, in
addition to the values of the monitored objects. Finally, once the recognizer has determined the truth
of all the conditions and events de ned in the monitoring script, it sends to the checker its \exported"
events and changes in \exported" conditions.
4.3 Run-time Checker

The checker maintains a timed trace of the current execution based on the messages received from
the event recognizer. Each event is supplied with a
timestamp, re ecting the time when the event occurred. Each value of the timestamp introduces a
new state in the time trace. At each state, event
occurrences and the values of conditions are evaluated. As several received events may have the same
timestamp, evaluation of a state is deferred until
all events with the same timestamp arrive. The
checker is guaranteed to receive messages with nondecreasing timestamps. In the prototype, TCP/IP
protocol is used for communication between the
event recognizer and the checker to ensure proper
sequencing. The truth value of every event and condition can be evaluated in constant time in terms of
the length of the trace and linear in the size of the
requirement speci cation.
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Once all the truth of all the events and conditions
has been determined, the auxiliary variables are updated. If the event guarding the update occurs at
the current state, the auxiliary variable is updated
as per the assignment rule. Whenever an alarm becomes true or a safety property becomes false, the
checker declares the program to be incorrect.

[6]
[7]
[8]

5 Conclusions

[9]

The paper makes a step towards bridging the gap
between veri cation of system design speci cations
and validation of system implementations in a highlevel programming language. The former is desirable but yet impractical for large systems, while the
latter is ecient but informal and error-prone.
To this end, we have presented a design and a
prototype implementation of an on-line monitoring
of correctness properties of real-time systems. Monitoring is based on formally speci ed system requirements. The formality of approach guarantees that
at least the current execution complies with the requirements. A variety of speci cation formalisms
can be easily accommodated in the framework. For
example, all properties expressed in real-time logic
RTL [8] can be eciently checked.
The immediate goals of the future work on this
topic include extensions of the prototype into a fullstrength monitoring system and extension of the
framework to other languages beyond Java. Another avenue of research is aimed at a transition
from passive observation to active guidance of the
monitored system. Our current system is geared towards the detection of faults. It would be desirable
in future to build monitors that can steer a system
to a correct state.

[10]
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